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Is a Contractual Clause Excluding a Right of Set-
Off Subject to the Requirement of 
Reasonableness in the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act?   
 
The Court of Appeal in Koh Lin Yee v Terrestrial Pte Ltd [2015] SGCA 6 (“Koh 
Lin Yee”) has decided that a contractual clause excluding a right of set-off is 
subject to the requirement of reasonableness in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
(Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) (“UCTA”). In doing so, it also laid down some general 
guiding principles relating to the application of the UCTA, namely, when a party 
is considered to be dealing “as consumer” under s 12(1), when a contract 
contains standard terms of business under s 3(1) and the application of the 
requirement of reasonableness.  
 
Facts and arguments 
 
The facts of Koh Lin Yee are not complicated. The appellants in the two appeals 
before the Court of Appeal were Koh Lin Yee and Allgo Marine Pte Ltd, and the 
respondent was Terrestrial Pte Ltd. Koh is the sole director and owner of all but 
one share in Allgo. On 25 May 2009, Allgo agreed to sell a flat top barge to 
Terrestrial for $1.2m. Although Terrestrial paid Allgo in full, Allgo failed to 
deliver the barge as it had itself failed to pay the barge builder an outstanding 
balance of $350,000. To facilitate the building of the barge, Terrestrial agreed 
to make two short-term loans to Allgo on 3 January 2011. Koh also agreed 
unconditionally to guarantee Allgo’s obligations to repay these loans. 
Terrestrial later agreed to make another loan to Allgo. These loans had become 
due and payable by certain stipulated dates, but Allgo failed to make any 
repayment. Terrestrial thereafter demanded repayment from both Allgo, as 
well as the Koh as guarantor of the loans.  
 
The appellants’ defence against the respondent’s application for summary 
judgment in respect of the unpaid loans was that Terrestrial had failed to pay 
monies owed under a separate contract with Allgo for the purchase of a tug. 
This in turn rendered the appellants unable to repay their outstanding loans to 
Terrestrial. As such, the appellants argued that they were entitled to set-off the 
monies due under their loans to Terrestrial against the sum owed to them for 
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the tug. The main difficulty with this argument was clause 12.2 of the earlier 
two loan agreements between Allgo and Terrestrial, which read as follows: 
 
“All payments to be made by [Allgo or Koh] under the [loan 
agreements] shall be made without set-off, counterclaim or 
condition…” 
 
One of the issues before the Court of Appeal was whether clause 12.2 explicitly 
excluded the appellants’ right to raise a set-off (legal or equitable) or 
counterclaim through the words “without set-off”. And if clause 12.2 did have 
this effect, the consequent issue was whether it is an unfair contract term within 
the meaning of the UCTA and therefore subject to the requirement of 
reasonableness prescribed by the Act.  
 
Interpretation of a contractual clause excluding a right of set-off 
 
In respect of the interpretation of clause 12.2, the Court of Appeal held that, in 
accordance with the freedom of contract, parties can agree to contract out of 
the right of set-off. However, if they wish to do so, clear words must be used. It 
is thus a matter of interpretation whether the words used in the contract 
amount to an exclusion of the right to set-off. Applying these principles to the 
facts, the Court of Appeal found that the words “without set-off” excluded all 
forms of set-off, with no distinction between legal and equitable set-offs. As a 
matter of practical consideration, therefore, these words can generally be taken 
to include all forms of set-off. 
 
The application of the UCTA to contractual clause excluding a right 
of set-off 
 
This next issue required the Court of Appeal to consider ss 3 and 12 of the 
UCTA, which are reproduced below for easy reference: 
 
Liability arising in contract 
 
3.—(1)  This section applies as between contracting parties where 
one of them deals as consumer or on the other’s written standard 
terms of business. 
 
(2)  As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any 
contract term — 
 
(a) when himself in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any 
liability of his in respect of the breach; or 
 
(b) claim to be entitled — 
 
(i) to render a contractual performance substantially different 
from that which was reasonably expected of him; or 
 
(ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual 
obligation, to render no performance at all, 
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except in so far as (in any of the cases mentioned in this 
subsection) the contract term satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness. 
 
Dealing as consumer 
 
12.—(1)  A party to a contract “deals as consumer” in relation to 
another party if — 
 
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor 
holds himself out as doing so; 
 
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a 
business; and 
 
(c) in the case of a contract governed by the law of sale of goods 
or hire-purchase, or by section 7, the goods passing under or in 
pursuance of the contract are of a type ordinarily supplied for 
private use or consumption. 
 
(2)  But on a sale by auction or by competitive tender the buyer is 
not in any circumstances to be regarded as dealing as consumer. 
 
(3)  Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party does not 
deal as consumer to show that he does not. 
 
As can be seen, in order for s 3 to apply, it has first to be shown either that one 
of the contracting parties “deals as consumer” or that one of the contracting 
parties deals “on the other’s written standard terms of business”. And if, either 
one (or both) of the two threshold requirements is satisfied, it has, in order to 
bring the exception clause within the scope of s 3, to be proved that the clause 
concerned falls within at least one of the categories set out in ss 3(2)(a), 
3(2)(b)(i), and 3(2)(b)(ii), respectively; and such clause would be inoperative 
only if it did not satisfy the “requirement of reasonableness”. 
 
The appellants argued that s 3 applied to clause 12.2 and that clause 12.2 was 
unreasonable and thereby inoperative. In order to do so, the appellants first had 
to show that either of the threshold requirements in order to invoke s 3 was 
met.  
 
Dealing “as consumer” 
 
First, the appellants submitted that they were dealing “as consumer” as they 
were not represented at the time the loan agreements were signed and 
Terrestrial was engaged in financing or lending money to them. In dealing with 
this argument, the Court of Appeal first pointed out that the requirements in ss 
12(1)(a) and (b) are cumulative. The starting point is the English Court of 
Appeal decision of R & B Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominions Trust 
Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 321, in which Dillon LJ read the phrase “in the course of 
business” under ss 12(1)(a) and (b) to mean that the transaction in question was 
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a “clearly integral” part of the company’s business, as opposed to being merely 
incidental to such business. In addition, a “degree of regularity” is needed 
before a particular transaction, could be considered a “clearly integral” part of 
the business. 
 
Applying this definition to the facts, the Court of Appeal found that Allgo’s 
obtaining of a loan was merely incidental to its carrying out of its business. 
Although Terrestrial adduced evidence that Allgo had intended to obtain 
financing from banks, there was no evidence pointing to the regularity required 
to constitute a course of business. Hence, Allgo was not contracting in the 
course of business and fulfilled the requirement under s 12(1)(a).  
 
This was not the end of the matter. Section 12(1)(b) further requires the other 
contracting party, Terrestrial in this case, to have contracted in the course of a 
business. This the Court of Appeal did not find satisfied as Terrestrial could not 
be said to have made the loans in the course of a business; in other words, the 
loans were not integral to Terrestrial’s business, which was certainly not to 
make loans.  
 
Because the requirements under ss 12(1)(a) and (b) are cumulative, and s 
12(1)(b) was not satisfied, Allgo failed to prove that it had dealt “as consumer” 
under the UCTA. The result is that s 3 could not be invoked. This part of the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment is thus noteworthy for its clear guidance on to the 
application of ss 12(1)(a) and (b) under Singapore law. 
 
Standard terms of business 
 
Alternatively, the Court of Appeal also considered that the loan agreements did 
not contain any standard terms of business within the meaning of s 3(1). The 
locus classicus is the English High Court decision ofHadley Design Associates 
v Westminster [2003] EWHC 1617 (TCC). In that case, Judge Richard Seymour 
QC considered that the phrase “standard terms of business” means a set of 
terms in the written form existing prior to the making of the agreement which 
was intended to be adopted more or less automatically in respect of transactions 
of a particular type without any significant opportunity for negotiations. This 
was not the case on the facts since the loan agreements were drawn up 
specifically to deal with certain circumstances that had arisen, that is, Allgo 
could not pay for the construction of the barge.  
 
Again, because the alternative threshold requirement under s 3 was not 
satisfied, s 3 could not be invoked. Nonetheless, for completeness, the Court of 
Appeal went on to consider, on assumption that either (or both) threshold 
requirements was satisfied, whether s 3 could apply to clause 12.2, being a 
contractual clause excluding a right of set-off. Again, as a practical matter, this 
now provides very clear guidance in the context of Singapore law as to the 






  5 
Application of s 3 of the UCTA to clause excluding right of set-off 
 
As already indicated at the start of this entry, the Court of Appeal held that s 3 
of the UCTA could apply to a contractual clause excluding the right of set-off 
which, in this case, was clause 12.2.  
 
There are two opposing views on this issue. On the one hand, it has been 
considered that clauses such as clause 12.2 merely define the contractual 
obligation between the parties and therefore fell outside the ambit of the UCTA. 
On the other hand, as accepted by the Court of Appeal, such clauses restricts 
the rights and remedies of the party who would otherwise have been entitled to 
rely on the set-off and therefore fell within the ambit of the UCTA. In preferring 
the second view, the Court of Appeal accepted the reasoning of the English 
Court of Appeal in Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] 1 QB 600 
(“Stewart Gill”), which dealt with the following clause: 
 
“The customer shall not be entitled to withhold payment of any 
amount due to the company under the contract by reason of any 
payment credit set off counterclaim allegation of incorrect or 
defective goods or for any other reason whatsoever which the 
customer may allege excuses him from performing his obligations 
hereunder.”  
 
Lord Donaldson MR held that this clause came within s 3 of the UK UCTA 
because it came within the varieties of exemption clauses set out in s 13 covered 
by s 3. Section 13 of the UK UCTA, which is in pari materialwith the UCTA, 
reads as follows: 
 
Varieties of exemption clause 
 
13.—(1)  To the extent that this Part prevents the exclusion or 
restriction of any liability it also prevents — 
 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or 
onerous conditions; 
 
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the 
liability, or subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence 
of his pursuing any such right or remedy; 
 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure, 
 
and (to that extent) sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding 
or restricting liability by reference to terms and notices which 
exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or duty. 
 
Thus, according to Lord Donaldson MR, and pursuant to the terms of s 13(1)(b), 
the clause in Stewart Gillexcluded the defendants’ “right” to set off their claims 
against the plaintiffs’ claim and further excluded the “remedy” which they 
otherwise would have been able to bring by means of a set-off. Furthermore, 
this clause also excluded or restricted the procedural rules as to set-off pursuant 
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to the terms of s 13(1)(c). Thus, on either account, the clause, or indeed, any 
clause excluding the right of set-off, would come within s 3 of the UCTA, being 
a variety of exemption clause caught by the statutory regime. The Court of 
Appeal inKoh Lin Yee accepted, and rightly so, this reasoning as 
correct.  Indeed, on a plain reading of the section, it is clear that clauses that 
exclude the right of set-off would come within its ambit. To construe it 
otherwise would be to ignore the clear meaning and (more importantly) the 
purpose of the section. 
 
The Court of Appeal also accepted that the reasoning in Stewart Gill did not 
affect the rights of parties to agree to include no set-off clauses in the contract 
that cover specific circumstances. Whether the drafting has such an effect and 
whether the particular clause attracts the application of the UCTA are separate 
questions.  
 
The application of the requirement of reasonableness to clauses that exclude 
right of set-off 
 
As to the relevant factors to determining the reasonableness of clauses that 
exclude the right of set-off, the Court of Appeal considered that such clauses 
have a clear rationale, namely, that it may be important for cash flow reasons 
that a party should receive payment in full under a contract so that the 
counterparty should be required to seek its right of a set-off in separate 
proceedings. From this starting point, the relevant factors are those enunciated 
in Schedule 2 of the UCTA, even though the Act provides that they only apply 
to ss 6 and 7 of the Act. 
 
In relation to the relative bargaining strength of the parties, whether or not the 
party impugning the exception clause concerned is experienced is a significant 
factor that the courts will take into account. The guiding principle seems to be 
that an experienced commercial party would not be taken into advantage of and 
hence any exception clause entered into by it is likely to be reasonable. Other 
important factors include whether the clause concerned is well known or 
accepted in commercial circles, as well as the availability of legal advice would 
be important. 
 
On the assumption that s 3 covered clause 12.2 in the present case, the Court of 
Appeal considered that it was reasonable since the parties were of relatively 
equal bargaining positions, and since it was a common provision in the context 




The Court of Appeal expressly left unresolved the issue of whether a clause 
excluding the right of set-off would be considered in full or in part when 
subjected to the requirement of reasonableness. In other words, would the part 
of the clause excluding the right of set-off be severed and assessed separately, 
or would the entire clause be assessed altogether? The answer to this question 
had practical consequences in Stewart Gill. In deciding to subject the whole of 
the affected clause to the requirement of reasonableness, the English Court of 
Appeal made it much harder for the clause to be found reasonable. This was 
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because the rest of the clause was couched very extensively, regardless of 
whether the exclusion of the right of set-off itself was phrased as extensively. It 
is conceivable that had the exclusion of the right of set-off be severed and 
assessed separately, it might have been found to be reasonable.  
 
It is perhaps understandable why the Court of Appeal elected to leave this issue 
open since the parties did not argue it. Preliminarily, it might be thought that 
the rationale behind the doctrine of severance might apply to govern this issue, 
that is, if severance does not alter the meaning of the clause, then there is no 
reason why the exception clause cannot be assessed only on its exclusion or 
restriction part.  
 
 
Goh Yihan (Associate Professor, Singapore Management University) 
 
 
* This blog entry may be cited as Goh Yihan, "Is a Contractual Clause Excluding a 
Right of Set-Off Subject to the Requirement of Reasonableness in the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act?", Singapore Law Blog (12 February 2015) 
(http://www.singaporelawblog.sg/blog/article/84) 
